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NOTES
The Wabash rule does place non-cumulative stockholders largely at the
mercy of a board of directors. If common stockholders will forego immediate
dividends, directors can channel a disproportionate share of the corporation's
profits away from non-cumulative preferred. Annual earnings may be retained
for several years. After non-cumulative preferred has received merely the
current year's dividend, common stock may be liberally rewarded with the
retained earnings themselves2l, or, more subtly, with profits which the pre-
ferred's retained dividends have financed. To stir a court to remedial action,
non-cumulative stockholders must at least prove that earnings were retained
in conflict with "wise administration of a going concern." 2 7 But since most
boards can readily discover some contingent liability or expansion plan justi-
fying retention of earnings, the Wabash rule tends to check only the unimagin-
ative common stockholders' board.28
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit should have stayed within the Wabash
formula. Not only has the rule, on the books for over twenty years, served
notice on draftsmen of preferred stock contracts, but doubtless has been re-
flected in market quotations on outstanding non-cumulative preferred. Over-
turning Wabash might provide a windfall for stockholders who bought at
prices that took account of the rule. Moreover, non-cumulative preferred was
typically issued not to attract new capital of the investing public, but as a
stopgap refinancing to6l of corporations in distress or as a bonus to e-dsting
stockholders.2 9 Since these circumstances would not seem to foster high
hopes in non-cumulative preferred stockholders, adherence to the Wabash rule
probably accords with their investment expectations3
26. Cf. Bassett v. U.S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 74 N.J.Eq. 663, 70 At. 929
(1908), aff'd, 75 N.J.Eq. 539, 73 Atl. 514 (1909).
27. Wabash Railway v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197, 204 (1930).
28. However, a judge looking at the end result of a series of retentions, may use
hindsight to rule that the retentions were improper at the time they were made.
29. "[Tjhe issue of noncumulative stock has been quite generally confined to three
occasions. It has been issued chiefly at the time of the reorganization of failed corpora-
tions as a kind of preference stock involving the least burden on the new company
struggling to regain its solvency. It has been issued at the time of the recapitalization
of solvent concerns, as a kind of common stock endowed with some slight advantage
over ordinary common stock. And, finally it has been given to shareholders as a stoc:
dividend, a present a 'little higher' than ordinary stock, yet a present not likely to
embarrass the giver." 1 DmviNG, FANcI,%. POLicy OF CoaowLmTIozs 151 (4th Ed.
1946). "All those [non-cumulative stock issues] listed within the past ten years aroze
out of railroad re-organizations except United Stores Corporation which was a re-capi-
talization." Communication to the YAIn LAw JounALr. from Philip L. West, Vice-Presi-
dent, New York Stock Exchange, dated December 28, 1951 in Yale Law Library.
30. Courts and commentators alike have been quick to attempt telepathy in this
field. Compare Wabash Railway v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197, 203 (1930) ("[T]he common
understanding of lawyers and businessmen. . . .") ilth Lattin, Is Non-Cun:t:agiz Pre-
ferred Stock In Fact Prefcrred?, 25 It. L. Rxv. 148, 158 (1930) ("[T]he reasonable
and more widely recognized meaning. . ."-contradicting Justice Holmes). Neither
author cited source material.
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Because the ambiguity of the term "non-cumulative preferred" invites
litigation, clarity in the stock contract should be the goal. In future stock
issues, all corporations should set out clearly the non-cumulative preferred
stockholder's dividend rights. Although the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission probably would compel future issuers to disclose these rights in regis-
tration statement and prospectus, 81 investors in scurity issues exempt from
federal regulation 82 must look to state blue-sky laws for protection. Dis-
closure-type laws88 might well require non-cumulative preferred rights to be
clearly stated. Alternatively, regulations should presume every future issue
of non-cumulative preferred to be cumulative if earned, unless the contract
made another meaning clear. 4 In this way, corporations would remain free
to draft any clear preferred contract terms that investors would accept, while
unambiguous disclosure would result. The market price would accurately
reflect the non-cumulative stock's rights. And stockholders would no longer
need to resort to courts to learn what rights they bought with their stock.
GROUP LIBEL LAWS: ABORTIVE EFFORTS TO COMBAT
HATE PROPAGANDA*
MINORITY groups are frequently the targets of hostile language. Still vivid
is the memory of the wave of methodical defamation on which the Nazis rode
31. "I think . . . that we would require a clear disclosure of the substance of the
Wabash holding." Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Louis Loss, Asso-
ciate General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, dated December 5, 1951
in Yale Law Library. See Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77 aa (1946).
Stock exchanges may also require some disclosure. "Our requirements covering listed
securities include, among others, the following: Certificates of each class of stock must
contain a statement of the rights and preferences of all classes of authorized capital stock
as granted by the certificate of incorporation or by-laws, as the case may be. In some
instances we have accepted summaries in lieu of verbatim transcripts." Communication,
supra note 29.
32. Regulation A, drafted by the SEC pursuant to § 3(b) of the Securities Act of
1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1946), exempts inter alia issuing corpora-
tions' security distributions which do not exceed $300,000 in any year.
The SEC may soon move to exert more thoroughgoing control over small issues.
See Crane, Changes Expected on Security Filing, N.Y. Times, October 14, 1951, p. 1,
col. 6.
33. For discussion of this type of state regulation, see ATxINS, EDWARDS, & MOULTON,
THE REGuLATION OF THE SECUarrss MaRxr 54-6 (1946); Wright, Correlation of
State Blue Sky Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL LQ. 258 n.2 (1941).
34. In states whereexisting administrative agencies are without sufficient power, thig
presumption would have to come from legislation. The existence of this presumption
would speedily come to the attention of the corporate bar who would draft stock con-
tracts with the presumption in mind.




to power.' In the United States, demagogues occasionally stimulate racial and
religious prejudices to gain political appeal.2 But more serious are the activ-
ities of professional hatemongers. The "business" of these individuals and
organizations is concentrated attack on minority peoples.3 Although less influ-
ential in recent years,4 their dogged attempts to incite inter-group hostility
create continual possibilities of race riots and other violent outbursts.5
Under existing civil and criminal libel doctrines, defamers of sizable groups
are immune if legally astute enough to avoid direct reference to an individual.
1. See Riesman, Democracy and Defanmtion: Control of Group Libel, 42 Co.. L.
REv. 727, 728-9 (1942); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair
Comment I, 42 Cot.. L. Pnv. 10S5, 10q8-1111 (1942).
2. For a discussion of Southern demagoguery, see MDAT, Az Am Cc n Dunns&
455-62 (1944).
Prejudice against the Negro was apparently stimulated and used to gain support for
the Prohibition movement, and against the Wages and Hlours Law. Id. at 456-7.
3. For a survey of the general activities, annual income, major contributors, and
publication circulation of such notable bate propagandists as Gerald L K. Smith,
Joseph P. Kamp, Upton Close, Merwin K. Hart, and A. Alderson Zoli, see Fo-srp,
A MEAsurn op Fanmoat 36-79 (1950). See also id. at 81-8 for a survey of lesser
figures. The 1949 incomes of the leading hate propagandists are reported as follows:
Gerald L. K. Smith ($150,000); Merwin K. Hart ($140,000); Gerald Winrod
($100,000); Upton Close ($50,000); Joseph Kamp ($50,000); Allen Zoll ($40,000);
Wesley Swift ($40,000). Id. at 80. For a list of hate propaganda groups, their
periodicals, books, pamphlets, and leaflets, and pertinent facts about them, see id. at
222-39.
For an analysis of the types of propaganda media employed by anti-Semitic organiza-
tions in the United States during 1947 and 1948, see WmmAun, How Su-cun a-
THasE RIGhTs? 92-5 (1949), indicating that pamphlets and leaflets vwere the most
frequently employed media.
4. The defeat of fascism in World War I had a deterring effect on the activities
and influence of the professional hate groups. See FoasTzn, op. cit. sMpra note 3,
at 81, indicating that the number of hate groups in the United States grew from 0O
in 1940 to 130 in 1946, and then dwindled to 66 in 1949.
5. For an analysis of race riots and other forms of violence, see Mvym.,x., A:
AarmcANu DmmmrA 558-69 (1944). Of all the violent outbursts of racial tension
stimulated by hate groups during World War II, the Detroit riot of June 20, 1949P was
probably the worst. See id. at 568; Life, Aug. 17, 1942, p. 15-23.
See also Maslow, Group Libel Reconsidered, Congress Veedy, Jan. 23, 194S,
pp. 8-9; Perlman & Ploscowe, False Defamatory Anti-racial and Anti-religious Propa-
ganda and the Use of the Mails, 4 LAw. Gunmn REv. 13-14 (Jan.-Feb. 1944).
6. If the libelled group is large (more than a dozen or so people), no individual
member has a civil remedy unless he shows that the libel refers directly to himself
E.g., Noral v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 2d 34S, 104 P2d 260 (1940)
(suit by one of 162 labor union officers failed because could not show libel referred to
himself). 'The individual has a remedy only if the group is so small that the libel
necessarily applies to each member, or if the libel applies to each member individually
and not solely to the group as a collectivity. For extensive surveys of both successful
and unsuccessful actions by individual members of defamed groups, see Riesman, mipra
note 1, at 756-64; Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 Cor. L.Q. 261, 263-6 (19S); Wilner,
The Ci il Liability Aspects of Defamation Directed Against a Collecthty, 90 U. o PA.
L. RLv. 414, 415-21 (1942).
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Hence specific statutes have been advocated to subject hate propagandists to
effective legal sanctions.7 It is contended that consistent convictions tinder
"group libel" laws would drain the resources of hate organizations, thus
discouraging future activity.9 Psychic harm suffered by members of systemati-
cally defamed groups could be partially alleviated by such convictions, whereas
absence of legal sanctions against hate propagandists might tend to create, in
Common law criminal liability presumably rests upon the tendency of the defamation
to provoke breach of the peace, and could, therefore, in theory, be imposed in libel
cases in which there is no civil liability. People v. Spielman, 318 Ill. 482, 149 N.E. 466
(1925) (newspaper article charging the American Legion with venality and lawlessness
held a criminal libel); People v. Gordon, 63 Cal. App. 627, 219 Pac. 486 (1923)
(publisher of Ku Klux Klan magazine criminally liable for falsely alleging that
Knights of Coumbus had taken vicious oath); 86 CExr. L.J. 334, 337 (1918). But
close investigation of the few successful prosecutions reveals that in each there was a
direct attack on some individual member of the group. E.g., People v. Edmondson, 168
Misc. 142, 144-55, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 257, 262-9 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938); People v. Spielman,
supra, where the court ruled that the libel need not be directed at an individual for
criminal liability; but, in fact, individual Legionnaires were defamed.
Some courts have apparently abandoned breach of peace as a criterion for criminal
group libel. See, e.g., People v. Edmondson, supra, in which the court dismissed an
indictment for libelling all persons of the Jewish faith, ruling that the essence of criminal
libel is the harm done to the individual in his community; Drozda v. State. 86 Tex. Crin.
R. 614, 218 S.W. 765 (1920), in which the court reversed a conviction for libelling all
Bohemians, ruling that the specific personal criminal intent necessary for conviction
cannot be imparted to the publication when it does not clearly indicate the individuals
meant to be attacked.
7. Libel actions, both civil and criminal, are of relatively little importance in this
country, quantitatively. This is indicated by the few available statistical surveys, despite
their narrow scope. See, e.g., CLARmc & SHULmAN, A STUDY OF LAW ADMINISITRATiOn
IN CONNECTICUT 12-13, 28, 31, 44 (1937), indicating that in Connecticut, over a 14
year period, less than 1% of all litigations involved slander or libel.
The FOURTH DEcENNIAL DIGEST, covering the years from 1926-1936, lists 52 criminal
libel proscutions; The FnTH DEcENmAL DIGEST lists only 15 for the 1936-1946 period.
The GEmRA DIGEST lists 1 for 1946, 0 for 1947, 1 for 1948, 1 for 1949, 2 for 1950,
and 3 for 1951.
8. "'Group libel' is a rag-bag phrase used to include a wide range of critical com-
ment that particular groups find objectionable. In broad terms, group libel laws may
be said to be enactments whereby the publishers and disseminators of statements that
tend to disparage racial and religious groups are rendered legally responsible for their
actions." Tanenhaus, supra note 6, at 262.
9. The firmest advocates of group libel legislation admit that consistent convictions
would be difficult to obtain. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS Anvisoity
CouNcIL BULLETIN No. 11, FEmEA GROUP LmEL LEGsI oTION (1949), supporting the
Javits-Klein Bill, cited infra note 14: "Lax enforcement, however, is an evil by no
means limited to group libel legislation .... The apathy with which some state FEPC
laws are administered is no reason for giving up the fight for FEPC. The only remedy
for lax enforcement is vigorous enforcement, not abandonment." Id. at 3. But see
Riesman, supra note 1, at 755-6, rejecting criminal group libel legislation because the
possibility of consistent enforcement is so remote.
[Vol. 61
NOTES
the victims, disrespect and distrust for the law.10 Group libel statutes could
favorably influence the behavior of individuals by deterring those tempted to
indulge in hate activities and reinforcing the reluctance of others to partici-
pate." And in the current cold war propaganda campaign, group libel legisla-
tion might help convince non-Americans that the United States sincerely wishes
to reduce racial discrimination. 2
Efforts to enact workable legislation, however, have met with little success. 13
A number of federal group libel bills, based on the postal and commerce powers,
were defeated in Congress between 1935 and 1949.1- Criminal statutes in eight
states permit prosecution of various types of group libel. But lax enforcement
and judicial restrictions have limited their effectiveness. Three show no
successful prosecutions,la two are so narrowly drawn as to merit little consider-
10. See Lusky, inority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE: L.J. 1 (1942)
for a general discussion of the importance of maintaining a policy which engenders in
minority groups a respect for the law.
On lack of trust for the law on the part of Negroes, and its causes and effects, fee
MYRaL., Ax A2--rmIcA DILEMA 525-6 (1944).
11. See in this connection Polier, Law, Conscience and Society, 6 LA*v. Gun. R=xv.
490 (1946).
12. On the international aspects of discrimination in the United States against the
Negro, see Mmnf.tAL, AN AlucAxz Di=MA 1015-8 (1944) ; Bucrz, AmurcA. Umnny
AND AsIA 29 (1942).
13. Debate has flourished on the advisability of such legislation. See, e.g., Cousins,
Editorial, Saturday Review of Literature, Feb. 1, 1947, p. 20, requesting an exploration
of the problem of how to deal with hate propagandists through some form of "group
libel" enactment. 200 or more letters were received in response, most of them opposing
such proposed enactments. Id., March 15, 1947, pp. 23-4. See also N.Y. Times, March
13, 1947, p. 25, col 7.
14. For a survey and criticism of some of these proposals, see Baum, Good-and
Bad-Libel Bills, Congress Weekly, Sept. 19, 1949, pp. 9-12, appraising the Barrett
Bill, H.R. 3908, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), the Davenport Bill, H.1L 3SU2, 31st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949), the Javits-Klein Bill, H.I\. 2269. 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), and
the Lynch Bill, H.R. 2328, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1943). See also NATIo:AL Co!T-
muITrry RELATioxs ADVisOrY Couxc. Buutn=,r No. 11, FEmtmA Group LintnLLas-
I-kZlON (1949), discussing the Javits-Klein Bill, supra; Perlman & Ploscowe, supra note 5,
favoring the Lynch Bill, supra; Stewart, infra note 41, at 12-14, discussing the Buckley
Bill, H.R. 2848, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), and a group libel proposal drafted by
Professor Jerome Michael of Columbia Law School.
For an extensive survey of e-isting municipal group libel ordinances, see Tanenhaus,
supra note 6, at 283-5.
15. MAss. GE-. LAWs c.272, § 98c (Supp. 1950); Nnv. Cozm. LAws § 10110 (Hillyer
1929); N. MEX. STA)T. AN,-. §§ 41-2725-7 (1941).
Of these the Massachusetts statute alone is directed at racial and religious hatred.
See Note, 28 MAss. L.Q. 104 (1943), discussing the statute (sponsored by the American
Jewish Congress) and its background.
The protection of the New Mexico statute is limited to a "fraternal or religious order
or society."
The Nevada statute defines criminal libel so broadly that it might be the basis for a
group libel prosecution: "A libel is a malicious defamation ... tending to ... impeach
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ation as anti-hate legislation,' 6 and the broadest measure, the Indiana "anti-
racketeering" statute, is still untested.' 7 The New Jersey statute,18 enacted in
1937 to combat the growth of the German-American Bund, has been declared
unconstitutionally vague with regard to speeches, and serious doubt has been
cast on the constitutionality of its broad libel provisions. 1
People v. Beauharnais20 is the first conviction under a group libel statute to
be upheld by an appellate court.2' The case arose under the Illinois group
libel law,22 enacted in 1917, and provided its first direct constitutional test. "
the ... reputation ...of a living person or persons, or community of persons, or
association of persons ... "
16. CONN. REv. STAT. c.417, §8376 (1949); W.VA. CODE ANN. §6109 (1949).
The Connecticut statute applies only to advertisements. It is a criminal offense to
"ridicule or hold up to contempt any person or class of persons, on account of the creed,
religion, color, denomination, nationality or race of such person or class of person,.
." in an advertisement.
The West Virginia statute is limited to pictures and theater performances which
"injuriously reflect upon ... any race or class of citizens, calculated to result in arousing
the prejudice, ire or feelings of one race or class of citizens against any other race or
class of citizens."
See also CALIFORNIA EDUCATIONS CODE §§ 8271-2 (1943), forbidding teachers and
textbooks from reflecting upon citizens "because of their race, color, or creed," violation
of which may involve dismissal.
17. IND. STAT. §§ 10-904-14 (Burns 1933), enacted in 1947 to combat the Ku Klux
Klan. See Tanenhaus, supra note 6, at 281-3, evaluating the Indiana statute. See also
MASLOW, PROPOSED REVISION OF INDIANA ANTI-HATE BILL (Commission on Law and
Social Action Report, Mimeo.) (Jan. 16, 1947).
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit.2, c.157B, §§ 1-8 (1937).
19. State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395, 22 A.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1941), 42 COL. L. RiV.
857 (1942).
See also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517 (1948) (declaring invalid a
statute prohibiting publication of "criminal news, police reports, or . . .stories of deedv
of bloodshed, lust or crime... ." as being vague and indefinite, and failing to give notice
of what acts will be punished).
20. 408 II. 512, 97 N.E.2d 343 (1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 809 (1951).
21. The case was tried before a jury which found defendant guilty. He was fined
the maximum sum of $200. People v. Beauharnais, supra note 20, at 515, 97 N.E.2d at 345.
22. ILL. REv. STAT. c.38, § 471 (1951) making it unlawful for "any person . . . to
manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any
public place in this state any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which
...portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens,
of any race, color, creed or religion ... or . . . exposes the citizens of any race, color,
creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of
the peace or riots. Any person ... upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine
of not less than fifty dollars, nor more than two hundred dollars."
23. For a prior decision vaguely implying constitutional validity, see Bevins v.
Prindable, 39 F. Supp. 703, 712 (E.D.Ill.), aff'd mcr., 314 U.S. 573 (1941) (Jehovah's
Witnesses denied injunction against enforcement of §471). The District Court said
that it was not passing on the constitutionality of the statute; and that even if uncon-
stitutional, an equity court might deny the injunction on the ground that there is no
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Beauharnais, president of the "White Circle League of America," prepared, and
distributed on the streets of Chicago, leaflets which defamed all Negroes2 '
There was no sign of violence.2 Nevertheless, he was convicted in the munici-
pal court of Chicago. On appeal, he challenged the statute's cunstituuunal
validity 2 0 The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the claim that the statute
was too vague and held that Beauharnais' acts created a -clear and present
danger" which justified abridging his right to free expression. '-'
immediate threat of irreparable damage. The court said, however, that though the
statute is vague and indefinite, it deals with a type of offense which defies definitiveness.
See also Fox Film Corp. v. Collins, 236 IlL App. 281 (1925) (upholding the validity
of §2787 of the Chicago Municipal Code, similar to §471).
In 1941, § 471 was employed to some extent against Jehovah's Witnesses. See Bevins
v. Prindable, supra at 713, where the court notes that more than a score of cases involving
violations by Jehovah's Witnesses were then pending.
The only prior appealed conviction under § 471 was reversed with no constitutional
finding. People v. Simcox, 379 I1. 347, 40 N.E2d 525 (1942) (reversing a conviction
of a Jehovah's Witness, under § 471, for distributing anti-Catholic leaflets). Although
the language of § 471 does not seem to refer to leaflets, the court regarded the word
"sketch" as including general printed material. The scope of the statute, originally
intended to enable the state to censor motion pictures, Fox Film Corp. v. Collins, supra,
has thus been greatly expanded.
24. On Jan. 6, 1950, the defendant called a meeting of the White Circle League to
obtain volunteers who would, on the following day, distribute and obtain signatures on
the leaflets. They were printed sheets of paper in the form of petitions to the city
council and Mayor Kennelly of Chicago. They were headed in large black letters:
"Preserve and Protect White Neighborhoods I From the Constant and Continuous
Invasion, Harrassment and Encroachment by the Negroes." They went on to solicit
the aid of one million white citizens of Chicago to oppose "Truman's Infamous Civil
Rights Program," and attack pro-Negro organizations as attempting to mongrelize the
white race. It was then pointed out that the "League" is the only instrument in America
combatting Negro aggression; that white people must unite; that "if persuasion and
the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the Negroes will not
unite us, then the aggressions ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns, and marijuana of the
Negro, surely will" People v. Beauharnais, supra, note 20, at 514, 97 N.E2d at 345.
25. The State conceded that there vwas no breach of the peace. Brief for Appellees,
p. 7 , People v. Beauharnais, supra note 20.
It is not necessary for prosecution under § 471 that the language be "productive of
breach of the peace or riots," that clause being written in the disjunctive. See note 22
supra.
26. The court erroneously asserted, id. at 517, 97 N.E2d at 346, that the Illinois
statute was held constitutionally valid in Bevins v. Prindable, 39 F.Supp 703 (E.D.Iil.
1941).
27. In its discussion of the First Amendment question, after restating the "clear and
present danger" principle as originally formulated in Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919), the court said: "A mere reading of the libelous publication in
question here, refers to Negroes as a class possesssing various criminal tendencies,
unchastity, and degrading sexual inclinations, all of which are 'fighting words' liable
to cause violence and disorder between the races." People v. Beanharnais, supra note
20, at 517, 97 N.E.2d at 346. Two discrete tests of the appropriateness of abridging
freedom of speech are thereby confused. The first of these, the "fighting words" test,
was formulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 563 (1942). It covers
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In deciding the First Amendment question, the Illinois court said Beau-
harnais was not entitled to constitutional protection since "riots would cvcntt-
ally result between the members of the White Circle League of America and
the Negro race."'28 The focus of the "clear and present danger" test, however,
has always been on the immediacy of the threat.20 At first the test was applied
in cases where expression created danger of overthrow of, or serious injury to,
the government. 30 Subsequently, it was also applied to expression which
threatened breach of the peace. 3 ' Although the immediacy requirement was
recently modified in Dennis v. United States, 2 where the danger was overthrow
only utterances reflecting the bare emotion of the speaker or writer which, by their
very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It is
felt that such expressions are no essential part of any exposition of idea,, and are
therefore without the scope of the First Amendment. Id. at 571-2. It is only when the
utterance is within the scope of First Amendment protection that the second test, the
"clear and present danger" test, is applicable. See Note, 47 COL. L. REV. 595, 605 (1947).
28. (Italics supplied), People v. Beauharnais, vipra note 20, at 517, 97 NE.2d at 346,
29. See, e.g., the original statement of the test in Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (state statute requiring registration
of labor organizers held invalid as applied) ; Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943)
(invalidating the part of a statute which forbade the teaching and advocacy of refusal
to salute the flag during wartime, as constituting a danger too remote to satisfy the
requirements of the test); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (reversing
convictions for contempt of court): "What finally emerges from the 'clear and
present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished."
For a detailed survey of the "clear and present danger" cases, see Appendix to
Opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 556-61
(1951); Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of its Applicability,
48 MIcH. L. REv. 811 (1950) ; Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition,
Syllabus and Selected Readings for Social Sciences 3 at the University of Chicago
290-9 (13th ed. 1947). See also MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 28-56 (1948) discussing and evaluating the test.
30. The test was first articulated and applied by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenek v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (affirming conviction for conspiracy to violate
the Espionage Act of 1917). Next, the test was applied in Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U. S. 204 (1919) (affirming conviction for conspiracy to obstruct recruiting In
violation of the Espionage Act of 1917), and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919) (affirming conviction for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917).
31. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (invalidating an Alabama statute
forbidding loitering or picketing). See also, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (solicitation of funds by Jehovah's Witnesses who played records describing
books which they were selling door-to-door and in the streets of New Haven held not
to constitute a clear and present danger of breach of the peace).
The first curtailment of an expression threatening breach of the peace, under an
application of the test, seems to be Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941) (affirming an order enjoining
picketing because of threat of violence).
32. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Here the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction of 11
Communist leaders under the Smith Act. 54 STAT. 670 (1940), as amended 62 STrT.
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of the government, the test has never been relaxed in the case of threatened
breach of the peace.3 Since in such cases the threat is merely to local public
order, legislative limitations on expression should be scrutinized more care-
fullyA. 4 When there is no immediacy such restrictions would still seem to be
unconstitutional.
Possible infringement of First Amendment rights is not the only undesirable
feature of group libel laws. Chances of effectiye enforcement are lesstned bv
80 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §23-5 (Supp. 1951). The majority kf thw C4urt indirectly
repudiated the "immediacy" requirement by adopting id. at 510, Judge Learned Hand's
reformulation of the "clear and present danger" test: "In each case [courts] must
ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). See Mr. Justice Black's dissent, Dennis v. United
States, supra at 579-81, in which he accuses the majority of the Court of "jettisoning"
the "dear and present danger" rule, and Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent, id. at 531-91, in
which he reaffirms the importance of strict adherence to the "immediacy" requirement.
For a detailed analysis of the "clear and present danger" test, and its application in
the Dennis case, see Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts,
65 HAnv. L. Rv. 1 (1951).
See also Nathanson, The Commnimst Trial and the Clcar-and-Present-Dangcr Test,
63 HARV. L. REv. 1167 (1950) : Note. The Cicar an J/or Present Dangcr Lh:trinc:
A New Equation, 5 RTUTGERS L. REv. 413 (1950).
33. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-11 (1940), in which the
Court set aside a conviction for inciting a breach of the peace on the ground that the
"immediacy" requirement had not been met. The Court maintained that in practically
all of the decisions curtailing expressions threatening breach of the peace, "the provocative
language... consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the person
of the hearer." Id. at 309. The decision w,;as based on a finding that there was "no
assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy,
no personal abuse." Id. at 310.
Also, compare Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), with Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951). In the former case the breach of peace ordinance under which
defendant was convicted was ruled invalid as construed by the trial court on the ground
that it undermined the "immediacy" requirement by curtailing speech which simply
"stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates
a disturbance. ..!'
In the latter case the defendant, speaking at an open air meeting, was convicted for
disorderly conduct. The evidence was held sufficient to sustain a finding that Feiner
was deliberately trying to arouse Negroes against whites, and that the police did not
step in until necessary to prevent a riot. Feiner was not arrested until, after several
requests, he refused to descend from the speaker's platform. Thus, in both cases
immediacy was the essential criterion, although curtailment of expression was upheld
in the second and not in the first.
34. That the "immediacy" requirement might be relaxed only when the danger is
of a greater order of magnitude was implicit in Judge Hand's reformulation of the
"clear and present danger" test. See note 32 supra. This was pointed out by Richard-
son, supra note 32, at 17-18: "It seems ... accurate ... to regard the factors of
probability and gravity as varying inversely with each other to produce a quantum
upon which the ultimate question of constitutionality depends: the more serious the evil if
it should occur, the less strong need be the showing of its probability, and vice versa. ... "
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the likelihood of nullification either on the prosecution or jury level.35 Ac-
quittal, which might be taken as official approbation, would enhance the defen-
dant's prestige. Conviction might make the defendant a martyr who could
accuse the prosecution of violating civil liberties. Moreover, the necessarily
vague language of a group libel statute makes it a legal blunderbuss, likely to
hit wide of the mark.36 To avoid the danger that expression not designed to
stimulate prejudices will be subject to prosecution, most group libel laws have
been hedged with purported safeguards. Typical is the provision that proof of
truth constitutes a valid defense.37 But giving defendants the chance to argue
the "truth" of their hate canards would make the trials sounding-boards for
their propaganda. 38 Such "prosecutions" might be warmly welcomed by pro-
fessionals.39
35. Either political fear or personal bias on the part of state attorneys could limit
the number of prosecutions. Furthermore, members of the minority group in question
would often be poorly represented on venire lists. But even if equally represented they
might be readily recognized and quickly challenged. On the other hand, latent anti-
Semites and anti-Negroes would not be faced with these obstacles.
For a discussion of the problems of nullification, see Tanenhaus, supra note 6, at 300,
in which he concludes: "The average jury would contain one person with a pronounced
anti-Semitic outlook, and several more who were somewhat bigoted."
See also Analysis of Gillette Bill for Propaganda Exposure, 87 CONG. Rue. Ant.
A1038 (1941).
36. See, e.g., CHEAFFE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 125-6 (1947)
commenting upon vagueness as an inherent characteristic of group libel legislation.
37. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS, c.272, § 98c (Supp. 1950). This statute admits truth
without qualification as an absolute defense. The defendant may also maintain the
firmly established chief libel defenses of privilege, or absence of malice.
38. On the use of the "sounding-board" technique by the Nazi Party in its rise
to power, and by Representative Sweeney of Ohio as Father Coughlin's spokesman, see
CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 122 (1947).
For accounts of demonstrations staged in'courtrooms by the Nazi, see N.Y. Times,
June 10, 1932, p. 6, col. 3, describing the insolence with which Hitler answered the
court in a libel case against him, and the cheers of his admirers. See also N.Y. Times,
Apr. 28, 1931, p. 54, col. 4.
For examples of the sort of vicious propaganda disseminated in the courtroom under
the guise of proof of truth, see Brief for Appellants, p. 16, People v. Beauharnais, su pra
note 20: "If one may comment upon this (the tendency of races to stick together)
and show the possible evils of this cohesion, there could possibly develop in this country
a revolution such as occurred in Haiti where the negroes overthrew the whites and
became supreme."
39. That William Dudley Pelley welcomed his forthcoming trial is evidenced by
his statement in contemplation thereof: "What is being offered me on a silver platter
by the Administration, it would seem, is the opportunity of my whole career to offer
in tangible and positive shape what I know . . .at last I would seem to have a forum
where I can produce under Federal subpoena, data running into the truckload that ought
to set off more internal blitzes than Adolf's Luftwaffe." Newsletter, May 18, 1942, p. 2.
See ST. GEORGE & DENNIS, A TRIAL ON TRIAL: THE GREAT SEITloN TRIAL oF 1944
(1946), for a discussion by the defense attorneys of the mass trial of 30 hate propa-




Recognizing these failings, some advocates of affirmative legislation have
proposed compromise methods for checking hate propaganda. One suggestion
is a "compulsory reply" statute requiring the publisher of a libellous statement
to print a rebuttal written by selected members of the libelled groupY The
most publicized of these proposals involves forming an "Advisory Committee"
composed of one representative from each minority group.41 The Committee
would decide whether to reply, and would appoint authors. The basis for its
decisions would be the extent to which the libel is likely to mislead and the
desirability of replying. The proposal aims to mitigate the effect of the defama-
tory statements while avoiding the shortcomings of criminal process under
conventional group libel laws.
This approach, however, seems administratively unfeasible, and could do
more harm than good. The "Advisory Committee" would have to reconcile
the divergent views of various minority groups or impose its will despite them.
Without substantial agreement either no reply would be ordered, or the reply
would evoke the hostility of dissenters. Furthermore, delay, caused by inter-
group disagreements, would lessen the reply's timeliness and tend to revive
and reinforce the effect of forgotten libels. Even if not delayed, it would be
effective only if better propaganda than the libel. The requirement that the
reply be non-defamatory gives the libel a considerable edge. Finally, unsophis-
ticated readers might assume that there must be some truth in the offensive
statement, since the government wants to see it debated. Enveloping the libel
with an otherwise unobtainable aura of importance might well be the net result
of this expensive and time-consuming procedure.
A second alternative is a statute authorizing a civil suit for an injunction
against continued group libel.42 The Columbia Lauo Revicaw draft is the one
40. This proposal is patterned after many foreign "reply" statutes, currently in
effect, which apply only to individual and not group libel. See Rothenberg, The Right
67 Reply to Libels it the Press, 23 J. Coup. LErG. & In'L L. 33 (1941), for a discussion
of the "reply" statutes which apparently are in effect in all of the major countries of
the world with the exception of Great Britain and the United States.
See also CHArz, supra note 38, at 145-86, discussing similar foreign "reply"
measures. Chafee recommends that group libel not be included vthin the scope of the
"reply" device. Id. at 185-6.
For a discussion of the German (Berlchtlgung) and the French (droit do r~ponse)
laws, and their inadequacies, see Riesman, supra note 1, at 1109-17.
41. This proposal, in the form of a detailed outline, wvas submitted to the President's
Committee on Civil Rights on June 5, 1947. It is a 32 page memorandum entitled,
"Group Defamation and Civil Rights," prepared by Milton D. Stevwart, Director of
Research of the Committee. It -as inspired by Professor Harold D. Lasswerl's
"Instant Reply Plan," which would require that all printed hate propaganda contain a
reply under the same cover, and with equal legibility and prominence. LAssvwuu,
DmsocRAcy THnoR0GH PuBLic OrimoN 106-16 (1914).
42. 1-m. STAT. § 10-907 (Burns 1933) is the only legislation in this country offering
the remedy of injunction. Like the remaining sections of the Indiana "anti-raceteering"
law, it is as yet untested. See note 17 supra. Under this section the injunction action
must be brought either by a prosecuting attorney, or the Attorney General of the State.
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most worthy of consideration. 43 It would permit courts to enjoin not only
repetition of the libel, but also its "substantial equivalent." Courts could also
order the posting of a bond conditioned upon no further violation. Three
provisions are designed to guard against strike suits: plaintiffs can obtain no
damages; defendant may demand that plaintiff post a $300 bond to guarantee
the costs of an unsuccessful action; plaintiff is forbidden to discontinue the
action voluntarily.
Although more manageable than the "reply" technique, this proposal has
serious constitutional shortcomings. The doctrine prohibiting "prior restraints"
on publication raises a considerable hurdle.44 While dissemination of familiar
hate-instilling tracts, known beyond question to be false, might constitutionally
be enjoined, courts' power to ban future publication of "substantially equiva-
lent" material is extremely doubtful.
45
Aside from the question of constitutionality, the statute fails in other respects.
To safeguard against suppression of legitimate publication, truth is made a
defense. Once more it is this safeguard which weakens the statute and intro-
duces dangers. The historical reluctance of equity courts to accept jurisdiction
in cases involving the protection of "mere personality"40 could readily lead
them to a broad construction of the "truth" defense, so that partial "truth"
would suffice. Few injunctions would then issue. Here, as in the criminal
court, the "truth" issue involves the "sounding-board" danger. Here too, if
See also MANITOBA REv. STAT., c.119, § 14 (1940), (Canada), authorizing any
member of the libelled group to seek an injunction.
43. Note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, 47 COL. L. Rav. 595, 609-12
(1947). This draft also contains a severable, narrowly drawn, criminal section to
meet with the problem of breach of the peace.
44. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1930), is the case most nearly in point. The
statute invalidated in that case permitted an injunction against all publication until such
time as the publisher persuaded the issuing judge that he would print nothing improper.
The Columbia Law Review draft merely prohibits repetition of the offensive matter.
45. See Tanenhaus, supra note 6, at 292-3, where it is suggested that such notoriously
false publications as the "Knights of Columbus Oaths" and "The Protocols of the Learned
Elders of Zion" might be enjoined without danger of First Amendment pitfalls. That
the "Knights of Columbus Oath" has conclusively been held to constitute a criminal
libel, see the four cases in point: Alumbaugh v. State, 39 Ga. App. 559, 147 S.E. 714
(1929); People v. Gordon, 63 Cal. App. 627, 219 Pac. 486 (1923); Crane v. State,
14 Okla. Crim. 30, 166 Pac. 1110 (1917); People v. Turner, 28 Cal. App. 766, 154 Pae. 34
(1915). The unquestioned criminality of this publication is, for all practical purposes,
as effective a "prior restraint" as would be preventive action by a court of equity. The
penalty for committing criminal libel can hardly be said to be less deterrent than the
penalty for violating an equity decree. So refusal to enjoin such an unquestioned
falsehood because of the rule against "prior restraints" would, at best, be unrealistic.
However, the same cannot be said of "substantially equivalent" material. In such
cases the criminality is not unquestioned until adjudicated, and an equity court might
very well deny an injunction as a "prior restraint."
46. See, e.g., 38 COL. L. REv. 1291 (1938) on the refusal of equity courts to grant
injunctive relief against defamation. See also Pound, Equitable Relief Ayainst Defamia-
tion and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REv. 640-51 (1916).
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